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Introduction
Estonian security has never been stronger than today. Estonia is a member of NATO, the European Union (EU) and the euro zone, Estonia also has the fastest growing economy and the lowest debt in the EU. On other hand, security concerns still exist, and global security developments will have a greater impact on Estonia than ever before. Russia has imperial ambitions and its non-democratic regime remains unpredictable in its domestic and foreign affairs. With a strong trans-Atlantic link, and with a well functioning NATO, Estonia is unlikely to witness a kinetic conflict in NorthEastern Europe. Rather Estonia's and other Baltic and Nordic states' security will be challenged within a wider spectrum of threats.
Based on an understanding of the wider security issues my Strategic Research
Project will develop a neo-realist answer to the following questions:
A. If global and regional factors are about to change, is the Estonian Security Strategy, which is based on a comprehensive approach, still relevant? B. How can the Estonian security architecture be improved?
The paper is divided into three parts. The first outlines the theory, the second chapter examines the main global factors that are likely to impact the Estonian security situation, and the third chapter will analyze the existing Estonian Security Strategy and offers recommendations.
Estonian Security Environment: International Relations
Theory and Conventional Deterrence.
"Even if you are on the right track you will be run over if you just sit there" Will Rogers
The purpose of this chapter is to bring out a sound security theory in order to support further arguments and suggestions. Based on the neorealist understanding of
International Relations, especially in the Copenhagen School of International Relations, the wider approach to security, Regional Security Complex Theory and securitization, will be discussed. At the end of this chapter conventional deterrence and its relation to National Security Strategy is described.
Theory is an abstract concept and can be used differently, depending on the given situation. There are many international relations theories to explain or apply to a situation. The central figure of the Copenhagen School, Barry Buzan, states that:
"Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence." 1 
Security in wider terms
Security according to the Copenhagen School is understood in wider terms than the political-military and state-centered view of traditional security studies. 2 According to
Buzan, security is a combination of the individual, state and international system while taking possible conflicts between the three levels into account. 3 According to neorealist 3 theory, states are competing for more security. Unlike in realist theory, where this certainly leads to conflict (use of power), in neorealist theory, the certainty leads to increased security, because relative balance of power is understood. Uncertainty leads to the desire for more security. Buzan stated the Copenhagen School view, "In this approach, security is understood not as the content of a particular sector (military), but as a particular type of politics defined by reference to existential threats and calls for emergency action in any sector." 4 
Securitization
Based on a wider understanding of security as such, the action against existential (or at least the perception of) threats that legitimize the breaking of the rules are defined as securitization. According to Buzan: …securitization is a process-oriented conception of security. In other words, while classical approaches of security focus on the material dispositions of the threat including distribution of power, military capabilities, and polarity, securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. Securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security.
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Securitization does not automatically mean involving military or intelligence services.
To solve the issue, in democratic societies those institutions are closely checked to keep them separate from political life. Securitization is a political choice that accepts that an issue is beyond "business as usual". To achieve needed ends more radical means and ways will be used. Ole Waever argues that: "Until the invention of the concept of securitization, 'widening security' had to specify either the actor (the state) or the sector (military), or else risk the 'everything becomes security' trap. Power is described traditionally as the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Soft power is the ability to do so without coercion. Realists often dismiss soft power and merely see this as a side effect of military or economic power.
American political scientist Joseph Samuel Nye, the 'inventor of soft power', argues that: "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. … soft power is not merely the same as influence." 
Smart power
Joseph Nye offers an approach -'smart power'-which is the ability to combine soft power of persuasion and attraction with hard power of coercion and payment. 9 The smart power concept carries an old idea about 'the carrot and stick". The real art is to establish a common strategic vision, and, balance soft and hard power accordingly. For There are different opinions as to which regional security cluster the Baltic States may belong. But even authors advocating for a Baltic and Northern-European common security complex, such as Stephen Walker, are asking: "Or will the particular configuration of the regional power disparities, nationalist identities, and the lack of a common external threat lead to more than one security strategy and the creation of a security complex based on exercise of both soft and hard power?" A Nordic-Baltic security cluster assured by the superpower and supported by other
Europeans is a possibility to balance the power in the region and maintain a longlasting peace. To preserve peace, Estonia, with its limited national power, needs to cooperate with other nations to commonly create a counter weight to a larger Russian power.
Deterrence theory is based on the assumption that actors (states) are rational and the decision between peace and war is made in clear understanding about of outcome of war. 8
Conventional Deterrence
It is in Estonia's best interest is to avoid war and still preserve its core values and national interests. One way is deterrence. Deterrence is considered a coercive strategy; its main purpose is to persuade others that they must not act for fear of consequences.
Lawrence Freedman in his book Deterrence states, "Deterrence can be a technique, a doctrine and a state of mind. In all cases it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those boundaries." 15 Deterrence is often discussed only in the framework of the military sector. And even then deterrence is viewed narrowly, taking into account actions across recognized international boundaries within a particular form of warfare. Based on the theory of a widened understanding of security, other security sectors will be involved (and prepared to do so in a timely manner). In a strategic context, the aggressor should be convinced that any aggressive moves will fail to succeed -because within resistance (even if there is militarily success), hurts other sectors in ways that outweigh the possible gains for the invader.
The problem for the defender lies in the time -the coercive actions in other sectors are more likely to take longer time than direct military actions -so, the defender needs to be prepared for a long-term fight. During this time, actions in different security sectors need to be orchestrated and adapted in a timely manner. Estonia, in its deterrence effort would not be alone. Estonia is linked by bilateral relations with other nations, and is a member of NATO and the EU as well.
The Estonian Security Environment.
In this chapter, the answer is provided to the question raised in the beginning: If the global and regional factors are about to change, is the Estonian Security Strategy based on a comprehensive approach still relevant? The changes that Estonia is confronting can be described as changes in the existing balance of power. The powers are relative to each other. In the region, Russian economic, and as a result, also its military power is beginning to rise. European political and financial problems are the root of slower economic growth. Relative economic and political weaknesses are causes for the decline in European military power. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific region is demanding more US attention. The question is not only changes in the current balance of power, but also, how much will the power change, and is that change enough to cause friction between the security actors? In many ways, Estonia is like litmus paper, with its position in one of the friction points between the West and Russia.
Threats
The security threat that is not only most likely but ongoing, is the Russian use of the combination of soft and hard power. Russia's use of military power, which is considered the most dangerous development with grave consequences, is a low probability for While the strong trans-Atlantic link is maintained, and NATO, as well as the EU is fully functioning, the biggest threat toward Estonia is Russian hard power other than kinetic military power. That does not mean that military hard power is not important; it is. The paradox of 'hard power' is that the stronger Estonia is, the more unlikely it is that it will need to employ "hard power" to defend its independence with weapons.
That leads back to deterrence discussed in chapter 1.5. Estonia needs to be strong enough to hold for some time to allow the NATO alliance or, in a worst case, a coalition of the willing, to deploy and maintain the combat readiness that will deter Russian The power of the USSR was mainly military and ideological. Today's Russia is not able to copy the former great power-it is looking for new ways. One Grand Strategic option for Russia is to seek bigger influence by using hard power, as in the case of and internal problems -the mass army needed to defend against China in the East is about to being significantly reduced.
2) The high readiness Russian forces in the Baltic region give Russia strategic superiority in the initial stages of conflict, and the Putin regime is placing them on the borders of peaceful Northern-Europe.
Russian officials rushed to claim that the Russian military reform will go on even without recently fired Defense Minister Serdjukov. 25 26 The four main 'ways' of the reform are:
1) Restructure the officer and NCO corps, with more emphasis on platoon-company level leadership. Reshaping a system of military education.
2) Reorganizing the Soviet style command and control system, similar to the US Army BCT concept.
3) Improving a mobilization and combat readiness system.
4) Ambitious weapons system modernization, where, according to Dmitry Rogozin
Russia will allocate over 20 trillion rubles (668 billion U.S. dollars) for the program until 2020, and an extra three trillion rubles (100 billion dollars) for modernizing the defense sector. 27 Military reform is ongoing, but there seems to be no consensus among Russian problems. Others argue that with reforms and modernization, Russia will be able to surmount these problems…" 30 In any case, strong or weak, Russia remains a danger to its neighbors, until it is fully democratic and seeking good neighboring relations based on common profits and understanding. The US military is still fighting in Afghanistan, countering violent extremism in other areas, and confronting a variety of emerging security challenges. Moreover, the post-Cold War drawdown was preceded by a decade long defense build-up that emphasized procurement and modernization, resulting in a smaller but mostly new, relatively unused, and technically superior inventory of U.S. military equipment. By contrast, notwithstanding the large budget increases in the base defense budget over the past decade -including funding for weapons development and acquisition we still have significant gaps in modernization that will need to be filled in coming years. 
Estonian National Security System
In chapter 3, the current Estonian national security system will be discussed and these suggestions made, based on security theories and observations made in previous chapters.
What needs to change is the national level command structure. A new structure must be able to employ national power in a well orchestrated and timely manner. Government interior order -and so all eleven ministries have their specific expertise and important role in making a well functioning system. According to the Estonian constitution, the wartime or state of emergency will be announced by parliament (Riigikogu). By law, the role and powers of the president will significantly increase in this event. Command relationships and routines will be changing significantly in the most critical moment.
However, it is not reasonable to change the command structure. The reason for this kind of legacy system is mainly historical. The crisis/wartime command and control system must be as close to the peacetime structures as possible in order to ensure continuity of work.
Based on the broader meaning of security and the assessment that an opposing power is more likely to use soft power (and in a more dangerous case hard and soft power combined) it would be wise to strengthen interagency capabilities under the Prime Minister. The best solution is a permanent bureau -a Bureau of National Defense, which would be responsible for coordinating policy on national security issues and which would advise the Prime Minister on matters related to security in a wider  Create, based on civilian and military career paths, national security professionals who are capable of coordinating the interagency process, and can support the political decision making on issues concerning wider security.
Main suggestions
 Change the Higher Command's organization and procedures to respond to wider security needs.
 Strengthen further a comprehensive approach to include all security sectors, and be prepared for securitization as needed. Have contingency plans for securitization of prioritized problems with short notice.
 Expand regional cooperation and build relations accordingly.
 Ensure that the Estonian military understands wider security concerns and is ready to support with its capabilities if requested by civilian authorities. The EDF's main mission will remain deterrence, and if this fails, to fight the nation's wars.
 Strengthen interoperability of the EDF and civilian institutions with its main allies. Prepare broad-based host nation support system.
Conclusion
In the beginning of this paper the following questions were examined: If the global and regional factors are about to change, is the Estonian Security strategy, which is based on a comprehensive approach, still relevant? And a second question: How can the Estonian security architecture be improved?
The Estonian Security Strategy and the comprehensive approach used in it is especially relevant due to the changes in the global and regional balance of power. The preferable way to employ the full spectrum of Estonian national power is deterrence.
Deterrence is often discussed only in the framework of the military sector, and even then, it is limited to taking into account actions across recognized international boundaries within a particular form of warfare. Based on the theory of a widened understanding of security, the other security sectors will be involved (and prepared to be involved in a timely manner). In a strategic context, an aggressor should be convinced that any aggressive moves will fail to succeed because of resistance or, even if militarily successful, because the pain inflicted by the use of the comprehensive approach in other security sectors (political, economic) outweighs the invaders possible gains. That leads us to the second question raised in this paper. How can the Estonian security architecture be improved?
In order to practically employ comprehensive ways and means the main way to improve the Estonian security architecture is to change its higher command organization. The crisis/wartime command and control system must be as close to the peacetime structures as possible in order to ensure un-stoppable work and not waste energy and time in transformation and rearrangements.
